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Abstract This paper analyzes international trade in value added products
when free trade and perfect competition in the market for an intermediate
product, such as raw fish, are the exception rather than the rule. Current
evidence from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regarding
disputes between countries, such as the V.S.-Canada dispute over trade in raw
herring, suggests that bilateral trade in raw fish among major exporters of
seafood products may not be completely free of structural and political bar-
riers.
The study presents models showing that restrictions on the exportation of
raw fish from an exporting country can make possible monopsony behavior
by fish processors in a rival exporting country and they outline the market
behavior of the players under such circumstances. The analysis illustrates
how, under such conditions, economic forces contribute to the creation of
trade disputes. It further demonstrates how expansion of the demand for final
product may, through trade reversal pressures, dilute the market power of the
processor monopsony and make trade restriction policies irrelevant.
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Introduction
In much of the fishery economics literature, It is assumed that seafoods are
produced under condition of perfect competition in both the raw fish and fish
processing sectors and that free trade prevails in international markets. This
paper analyzes international trade in value added products when free trade and
perfect competition in the market for an intermediate product, such as raw
fish, are the exception rather than the rule. The limited number of fish pro-
cessors in many coastal regions of seafood exporting countries provides a
base for the exercise of monopsony power by those processors vis-a-vis their
raw fish suppliers. Recent evidence from disputes between the U.S. and Canada
in the matters of trade in unprocessed Pacific herring, Atlantic groundfish, and
some Pacific salmon species suggests that bilateral free trade in raw fish be-
tween major exporters of seafood products may not be a reasonable analytical
assumption {e.g., see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 1986). Reasons
for this include both government restrictions and market structure constraints.
Understanding the mechanism of trade in unprocessed fishery products be-
tween these two countries may yield insights into bilateral trade issues else-
where.
The study specifically draws on features ofthe particular U.S.-Canada dispute
between Southeast Alaskan and Northern British Columbian processors, over
trade in unprocessed roe herring. The objective is to develop analytical models
showing the behavior of two rival seafood exporting countries competing in the
same import market when monopsony exists in the processing sector of one of
these countries, made possible, at least in part, by export restrictions in the other.
The analysis illustrates how, under certain conditions, economic forces contribute
to the creation of trade disputes. It further demonstrates how expansion of the
demand for the final product may, through trade reversal pressures, dilute the
market power of processor monopsony and make trade restriction policies irrel-
evant. There are lessons here for other markets as demand growth leads to trade
liberalization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the first section provides
an overview of the dispute between Canada and the U.S. In the second section
we abstract from the specific details of this dispute and present an analytical
model of U.S.-Canada seafood trade in general, in which Canada exports
raw fish to U.S. processors and both countries export the final product to a
third country. The third section shows the results of an export embargo on
raw fish from Canada to the U.S. processors in the presence of oligopsonistic
behavior by the U.S. fish processors with respect to their raw fish suppliers.
It compares the economic impacts of both market conditions (the export
embargo and oligopsony behavior) with the free trade situation of the second
section. The fourth section illustrates how expansion of the demand for final
product, through trade reversal pressures, dilutes the market power of the pro-
cessor monopsony in the U.S. and makes restrictive trade policies (the export
embargo) by Canada irrelevant. The fifth section compares the U.S.-Canada
free trade equilibriums after demand expansion with the results obtained in the
previous section. The sixth section presents conclusions and draws policy
implications.Trade Restrictions and Trade Reversal 33
An Overview of the United States-Canada Pacific Roe Herring
Trade Dispute
Japan is the principal country in the world in which there is a strong consumer
demand for kazunoko, considered a food delicacy and made from herring roe.'
Historically, the major source of supply of roe-bearing herring has been the waters
off northern Japan. While landings from this area have declined since 1926 (the
eariiest date for which records are available) a significant and abrupt drop in
production occurred in 1977, from which there has been no recovery (Atkinson
and Katsuyama, 1981). This occurred at the same time that many nations, includ-
ing the U.S., Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), ex-
tended jurisdiction over their respective fisheries zones. The exclusion from (or
significant restriction within) U.S. and USSR waters of Japan's distant-water
fleets added to the decline in Japanese landings in the late 1970s.
The continued domestic demand for kazunoko in Japan and the sharp decline
in domestic supply provided new export opportunities for both Canada and the
U.S. (ibid.). The response to this new opportunity elicited rather different eco-
nomic and political strategies in the two countries, however. Within an economic
environment characterized by increasing cross-border tension, these divergent
trade strategies produced conditions which ultimately brought the U.S. and Can-
ada into direct conflict.
Starting in the mid-1970s, Canada prohibited the export of unprocessed Pacific
herring {Culpa havengus pallasi), pink salmon {Oncorhynchus gorbuscha), and
sockeye salmon (O. nerka) (Canada Fisheries Act, 1970).^ In 1984-85, Canadian
buyers for the first time began to purchase Pacific roe herring directly from U.S.
fishermen in the Kah Shakes herring-roe fishery (and subsequently the Sitka
Sound fishery) of Southeast Alaska. Prior to the entry of Canadian buyers, U.S.
processors had enjoyed a market with many ofthe characteristics associated with
a classic oligopsony: that is, a small number of buyers and many sellers. In this
' Herring roe (kazunoko) is a traditional food used, primarily, as a part ofthe New Year's
celebration in Japan. Kazunoko is said to symbolize long life and prosperity, and obtains
a very high price in the Japanese market. Pacific herring is the preferred source of ka-
zunoko by the Japanese. As a result, virtually all the U.S. and Canadian harvest of Pacific
roe-bearing herring and herring roe ultimately finds its way onto Japanese markets. Herring
roe from Pacific sources tends to enter the market for "high end" uses. However, this is
only one of several product forms in Japan, each having its own set of importers who may
import to produce one or more of the product forms. Thus it is not inappropriate to think
of the Japanese import market as being competitive in nature.
^ No equivalent regulations governed the export from Canada of such economically im-
portant species as chinook salmon (O. tshawytscha)., coho salmon (O. kisutch), or chum
salmon {O. keta). Despite the availability of, among others, these latter three species of
Canadian-caught salmon, there appears to have been virtually no effort by U.S. proces-
sors, operating in Southeast Alaska (immediately adjacent to the British Columbia fisher-
ies) to import Canadian-caught fish for processing; this despite the fact that, in some years,
chinook (and on occasion coho) were in relatively short supply in Southeast Alaska fish-
eries. On the other hand, historical records indicate that, in some years, when pink salmon
were in particularly great supply in Southeast Alaska, raw pink salmon were shipped to
British Columbia plants for processing, thus relieving the glut in the U.S. fisheries. Fur-
thermore, the U.S. did not have equivalent reciprocal restrictions on the movement of
unprocessed U.S. catches to Canadian processors.34 Emami, Queirolo, and Johnston
case many herring fishermen, competing to harvest a highly perishable product
within an extremely short period, confronted a very small number of potential
buyers for their catch. Price and landings data for the years immediately preceding
the entry of Canadian buyers into these fisheries suggest that U.S. processors
consistently paid less per metric ton to U.S. fishermen than Canadian processors
paid Canadian fishermen. And when Canadian buyers entered the Southeast
Alaska herring fishery, ex-vessel prices were quickly bid up by between 50% and
100% over opening offerings by U.S. processors (Brown and Blaxall, 1986; Nel-
bro Packing Company. 1986). Based upon ex vessel price information provided by
the U.S. industry, and according to the petitioner's complaint filed with the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR),
''Because Canadian processors recognized that they need to pay higher
prices to U.S. fishermen in order to overcome the fisherman's loyalty to
their existing U.S. buyers, Canadian buyers offered substantially higher
prices for herring than U.S. processors in southeastern Alaska in 1985,
particularly in Kah Shakes, nearest the Canadian processors. Some price
pressure was experienced in Sitka as well, and additional Canadian quota
reductions in 1986 are expected to stimulate a significant geographic expan-
sion of Canadian roe herring buying activity.
At Kah Shakes in 1985, for example, opening prices in the range of $800
per ton (based on 10% roe content) jumped to $1200 to $1250 per ton within
two hours because of Canadian-based processors' bidding" (Office of the
United States Trade Representative, 1986).
The petitioners reportedly had information which suggested that Canadian
processors had, in the 1985 fishing season, already begun to solicit U.S. fishermen
for the 1986 season with promises of even higher base price offers, for Southeast
Alaska roe herring, (ibid.)
While other factors may have contributed to the absolute increase in prices
paid for roe herring during this period, many of which will be treated in subse-
quent sections of this analysis, the relevant issue in the U.S./Canada trade dispute
over access to Southeast Alaska fisheries dealt with "relative" price changes.
These were attributed to the entry of Canadian buyers on the U.S. fishing
grounds, as cited above.^
Under these conditions. Southeast Alaska processors understandably per-
ceived a threat to the economic status quo. In a coordinated effort to counter the
effects of Canada's entry into their market, Southeast Alaska herring processors
struck back with a series of political actions aimed at what they considered to be
unfair trade practices.* They expressed significant concern to the Alaska Gover-
' This trend has continued through the 1993 season, although to varying degrees depending
on the quality of the calch and Japanese market strength, according to industry sources. In
the 1993 fishery, for example, the presence of one Canadian buyer, in particular, reportedly
resulted in upward pressure on ex vessel prices in, at a minimum, the Sitka Sound roe
herring harvest {personal communication, Harold Thompson, Sitka Sound Seafoods, June
1993).
'* It should be noted that Canada had, prior to this time, not been rigorously consistent in
enforcement of its regulations against export of "unprocessed" herring. It was determined
by staff of the National Marine Fisheries Service, Fisheries Trade Services Division that.Trade Restrictions and Trade Reversal 35
nor and Legislature and to the U.S. administration about the restrictive Canadian
regulations, arguing that there were inherent inequities in an arrangement in which
Canadian buyers could purchase unprocessed roe herring directly from U.S. fish-
ermen but U.S. processors could not purchase directly from Canadian fishermen.
In late 1986, the USTR, acting on behalf of the Southeast Alaska fish proces-
sors, initiated an action against Canada under provisions of Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974. The USTR. in consultation with the petitioners, ultimately
sought relief through arbitration provisions of the GATT. Although the Section
301 petition cited alleged violations by Canadians pertaining to restraint of trade
of pink salmon, sockeye salmon and Pacific herring, and the list of petitioners
ultimately included processors from both Alaska and Washington State, as sug-
gested above, the initial source of the dispute centered on the lucrative Pacific
herring roe fisheries in Southeast Alaska and northern British Columbia.^
ln 1988, the GATT Council, reviewing the dispute, ruled in favor of the U.S.
Canada advised the U.S. that it could accept the adoption by the GATT Council
of the reports of the GATT panel and would act to remove the offending export
restrictions (letter of Canadian Minister for International Trade to USTR, March
21, 1988). Subsequently, Canada "officially" revoked the offending prohibitions
on export of raw herring, pink and sockeye salmon, ln their place, however,
Canada imposed new regulations which require that Canadian fishermen "land"
their catch in Canadian ports "for inspection" before export. The USTR argued
that the effective result was that the originally offending prohibition on direct
export of raw fish from Canada had been reinstated, although the new regulations
were extended in include all species offish (personal communication. Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, January 1993). These new export rules have been
challenged by the U.S. under provisions of the U.S.-^Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA), which had been entered into by the two countries during the time the
dispute was being adjudicated under GATT (Johnston and Queirolo, 1990. For
further discussion see Leitz and Wright, undated (a) and undated (b); and Mc-
Dorman, 1990). At the present time, the two nations are evaluating an interim
agreement negotiated under FTA in February 1990 and assessing options to that
agreement, which is scheduled to be revisited in 1993.
In the next section we present a highly simplified partial equilibrium trade
mode! which allows us to analyze this intra-industry trade dispute and the likely
consequences of interventions in raw fish markets by either the U.S. or Canada,
as late as 1977 and 1978. Canadian processors were selling unprocessed Pacific herring to
U.S. firms in the Seattle, Washington area for interim cold storage and refrigeration before
shipping the product back to British Columbia, Canada, where the roe was then stripped
(personal communication, Matteo Milazzo, National Marine Fisheries Service. Washing-
ton, DC. 1986).
' The harvest of roe-bearing herring progresses sequentially up the North American west
coast, beginning in San Francisco Bay (in November), proceeding through Washington
state (although poor stock conditions have virtually eliminated the herring fisheries there in
recent years), then northward along the British Columbia coast, to the Southeast Alaska
coast. The fishery then continues north and west along the Alaska coast, terminating in the
Norton Sound area, near Nome (in June). In the early to mid-1980s, the period during
which the dispute arose, the U.S. harvest accounted for between half and three-quarters of
the total North American catch. The Southeast Alaska fisheries, however, represented
only about 15% of the U.S. total.36 Emami, Queirolo, and Johnston
or both, on their domestic fishermen and processors. We believe the analysis
provides insights into how demand changes can affect the sustainability of market
imperfections.
An Analytical Model of United States-Canada Intra-industry Trade in
Roe Herring
In this section we present an elementary model of trade in an intermediate product
(raw fish) between two countries, where both are exporting the finished product
(processed fish) to a third country, which is assumed to have no market power.
The model follows and modifies previous analytical models on trade in both
intermediate and final goods introduced in the literature by Corden [1971], and
expanded by Houck [1986], Nakamoto, Halloran, and Martin [1990], Lindsey and
Johnston [1989]. However, our model differs from previous ones in that it (a)
allows for three countries, (b) employs the large country assumption, (c) admits
the possibility of monopsony behavior by the processors of one of the participant
exporting countries,^ (d) allows the other exporting country to impose restrictions
on exports and (e) deals with trade in a natural resource-based product.
Our objective is not to restrict our analysis to the specific U.S.-Canada dispute
but. rather, to illustrate how, in general, trade disputes may be resolved through
changing, often predictably, economic conditions. Thus we are somewhat selec-
tive in which facts of the case we incorporate in the model and a bit cavalier in the
assumptions we impose on biological and relative cost conditions. Nonetheless
we have retained many of the essential features of this panicular dispute. The
assumptions underlying the markets for the final product—processed fish (F) in
the U.S., Canada, and Japan, raw fish (R), and value-adding, nontradeable inputs
(V) in the U.S. and Canada are stated next.
We assume the worid consists of three countries; these are, for ease of expo-
sition, U (U.S.), C (Canada), and J (Japan). Countries U and C both produce a
homogenous tradeable final product F, by utilizing two inputs of production, R
and V, that are also produced domestically. Production of F is characterized by
fixed input-output ratios (i.e., F is produced via a Leontief-type production func-
tion) in U and Q? Input R is harvested by U and C from different stocks offish.
Input V is considered to be a composite input consisting of labor and capital. Input
R is a tradeable input only between U and C while V is a nontraded input. There
is no domestic demand for F in either U or C; F is demanded only by J in the world
market. The final product F is not traded between U and C but is exported by both
U and C to J. All countries are "large countries" in all markets. Finally, for
analytical expediency we assume that all three countries have identical currencies
and that transportation costs among these countries are zero.
In Figure I we assume, for graphic convenience, that one unit of R is combined
with one unit of V to produce one unit of F. Panels (a), (b), and (c) of Figure 1,
represent fish markets in U, C, and J, respectively. In panels (a) and (b), the
^ While not treated as such here, the structure of the Canadian industry has been viewed
by some as cligopsonistic (see Pearse, 1980).
' This assumption is made for analytical convenience only. Relaxing it would not materially
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Panel (a): USA Panel (b): Canada Panel (c): Japan
Figure 1. Free Trade Equilibriums in the USA, Canada and Japan.
supply curves of raw fish,—assumed to be upward sloping^—and the value adding
inputs are respectively labeled SR and Sv for the U.S., SR and Sy for Canada
(henceforth, variables for Canada are marked with an asterisk).
In an open access fishery the relevant long run. sustainable, supply curve may
include positively and backward sloping portions. However, the roe herring fish-
eries in Southeast Alaska and Northern British Columbia are highly regulated.
Indeed both fisheries are governed by allowable catch quotas that are conserva-
tively set to preclude resource depletion. It is not inappropriate therefore, to think
ofthe raw fish supply curves in this analysis as long run, sustainable relationships,
recognizing that this precludes treatment of dynamic issues.
By assumption, the intercept (the set up cost) for SR is higher than the inter-
cept for SR due to the U.S. fishermen's higher access cost associated with re-
moteness, but the slope of SR is lower than the slope of SR since labor costs,
landing taxes and capital costs are higher in Canada than the U.S. The supply
curve of V in Canada is higher and flatter than its corresponding curve in the U.S.
That is, while Canada is the more costly supplier of V at low levels of processing,
at higher levels the average cost declines such that it falls below that of the U.S.
for similar processing levels in part because of stricter regulations on disposal of
waste from processing facilities in the U.S. This may result from higher capital
costs in Canada but larger plant sizes and fewer size diseconomies in that coun-
^ We further assume that there is a price below which no fishing activity occurs and, at the
other extreme, that there is a point at which the supply curve becomes vertical, which is
a level of harvest established by management authority.38 Emami, Queirolo, and Johnston
try.^ These curves slope upward because higher prices result in increased demand
for inputs and, thus, higher input prices (for example, labor must be imported
from increasingly distant locations). In panels (a) and (b), curves labeled Sp and
Sp are the vertical summation of the curves S^ and Sy. and SR and Sy, respec-
tively. In panel (c), the demand in Japan for the imports of processed fish is
labeled Dp. In that same panel, the curve labeled SSR is the horizontal summation
of the supplies of R in panels (a) and (b), and the curve labeled SSy is the
horizontal summations of supplies of V in panels (a) and (b). The curve labeled
SSp in panel (c) is the vertical summation ofthe SSR and SSy curves in that panel.
United States-Canada Free Trade in R
Suppose there is free trade in R between U and C, and free trade in F between U
and J and between C and J. The equilibriums in each sector are found by equating
SSp with J's demand Dp at point E^ in Figure I, panel (c), (henceforth the super-
script "F" denotes the values of variables under free trade). In equilibrium, J
imports QRyp of processed fish. The aggregate production of Qpyp by U and C
requires a total of QR,y,F units of each input R and V in panel (c), with corre-
sponding prices of PR and P^, respectively. At equalized factor V prices of Py =
PO^, U allocates qy^ units of V to produce qy p units of F, and C allocates qy^p
units of V to produce q'yfy units of F. With free trade factor R prices are equalized
at PR = P^*", U's fishermen supply q^ unit of R, and C's fishermen supply qR*""
units of R, of which qy^p goes to domestic processors (utilization from domestic
supplies of R) and the rest is exported in the round to U. To produce qf.p units of
F in U requires qy p units of R to be combined with qy p units of V. Thus, with
free trade in R, U imports (q^ p - q^) units of R from C, which is equal to the (qR^
- qy'^p) units of R exported from C.
Canadian Export Embargo on R and the Exercise of Monopsony Power
by U.S. Processors
In the second section above, it was shown that, under free trade, Canada would,
probably, be an exporter of raw fish to the U.S. In fact this situation never arose
because Canada prevented such trade by imposing an embargo on the export of
unprocessed herring to the U.S., presumably to protect its fish processing indus-
try under the "infant industry" protection argument. This is considered next.
Let U.S. fishermen have the choice of selling their harvested raw fish in the
U.S., Canada, or both. Assume further, that Canada imposes an embargo on
exports of raw fish and that, simultaneously, U.S. processors arrange a collusive
oligopsony"* in buying raw fish from U.S. fishermen (henceforth we treat this
oligopsony as if it were a monopsony). Under these conditions, the new equilib-
' Alternatively, one may consider the situation where the supply of V in Canada is every-
where above that of the U.S., largely as a consequence of higher Canadian wage rates and
the private costs of social services assessed on Canadian firms. The results of this study do
not change.
"* The assumption that U.S. processors enter into a "collusive oligopsony" is an analytical
construct and is not intended to suggest that U.S. processors actually undertook this
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rium values are indicated with superscript "M" in Figure 2, and are determined
as follows.
First, we construct the residual demand for F facing the U.S. processors
(labeled as D^ in panel (a)) by horizontally subtracting Sp from Dp at all price
levels. Second, we construct the U.S. processors "derived demand" for raw fish
(DDR) from their fishermen by vertically subtracting Sy from Dr at each quantity.
Third, we construct the curve MFCR as the marginal factor cost of raw fish to
U.S. processors. Then, the U.S. processors impose a monopsony price of Ppf (the
price on SR corresponding to the quantity qR.y.p, determined by the intersections
of DDR and MFCR) on their fishermen. The resulting final product is supplied to
the Japanese market, in competition with final product from Canada's market.
Note that this monopsony position can be sustained as long as the Canadian price
(PR") is lower than that in the U.S. since, at those price levels, U.S. fishermen
would have no economic incentive to ship to Canadian processors. This discrep-
ancy, in turn, follows from Canada's export ban on raw fish, leading to higher
utilization of domestic supplies than in free trade (qR^^V.F ^ <1V*!F)' but lower
utilization in total, of Canada's raw fish (qR^y.F < QIR") and corresponding lower
ex-vessel prices.
A comparison of the value of the model's variables under a Canadian export
embargo on raw fish and monopsony behavior by U.S. processors with the values
ofthe model's variables underfree trade indicates that for prices: PR > PR > P^",
pM < pF = P7 < p;", P^ = Pl^ ^ Pp, and for quantities of V and F: q^y.p <
qy p, and qR"y p > qy^^p. Under these new conditions Canadian processors utilize










Figure 2. Equilibriums under Canadian Export Embargo on R and Monopsony Behavior
by U.S. Processors.40 Emami, Queirolo, and Johnston
processed fish to Japan than the volume they were supplying under free trade, The
U,S. processors are unable to import any R from Canada and utilize only their
own domestically caught R (qR.v.n)' which is purchased at monopsony prices.
These prices, however, are higher than what is paid to Canadian fishermen by
Canadian processors and higher than the "free trade" prices to U.S. fishermen
because of removal of competition from Canadian supplies. These particular price
relationships follow from the assumption made here about the supply functions in
the two countries. They appear to be reasonable approximations of the actual
situation, however: because of the higher U.S. price, Canadian fishermen have an
incentive to export R to the U,S. and, thus, to prevent this, Canada keeps in place
its export embargo on R. This is consistent with a situation in which two market
imperfections (monopsony in the U.S., and an export embargo by Canada) can
effectively coexist and sustain."
Demand Expansion in Japan and Trade Reversal
This section illustrates how an expansion of demand in the import (Japanese)
market for the final product, can mitigate the effects of the market imperfection in
both the U.S. and Canada. In fact the Japanese import demand for herring roe has
increased considerably in recent years (Bill Atkinson's News Report, 1991-92).
Reasons for this include:
a. An increase in the value of the Japanese yen relative to both the U.S. and
Canadian dollars.
b. The imposition of extended fisheries jurisdiction by both the U.S. and
Canada, cutting off Japanese access to the waters of these countries as both
harvesters offish and "over the side" purchasers offish. This reduced Japan's
domestic supply of kazunoko and hence increased its demand for imports (Dp may
also be treated as Japan's excess demand curve).
c. An increase in personal incomes in Japan.
d. An increase in the Japanese population.
e. An increase in the price of substitute fish products in Japan, because of (b),
above.'^
In Figure 3, as D^ increases to rVp. D, and DDR shift up to D, and DDR,
respectively. In the presence of monopsony in the U,S., and a continued export
embargo on R in Canada, the new equilibrium values of the model's price and
quantity variables are indicated with a superscript ('). The new levels of prices in
the U.S. and Canada for raw fish indicate that PR"' > PR , Because of the price
difference this monopsony arrangement cannot survive and the "equilibrium" is
not sustainable. Thus, Canada's export embargo is no longer relevant since Can-
ada shifts from having an incentive to export raw fish to being an importer of raw
fish. The increased demand in Japan has made the trade restriction unnecessary
and led to trade reversal. In the U.S. the processors can no longer maintain their
monopsony position because the U.S. fishermen now can sell at higher prices to
Canadian buyers. In summary, demand expansion has reduced the incidence of
" Actual price relationships did not mirror those discussed here. This may be a eonse-
quence of asymmetrically-held information, a hypothesis we are currently exploring.
'^ In the more general case, other factors, such as an import subsidy could also lead to












Figure 3. Demand Expansion in Japan and Trade Reversal in R.
market imperfections in the U.S. and Canada and has led to trade reversal in a
traded intermediate product.
Note that the trade reversal in this mode! is neither because of changes in
factor intensities due to the changes in the factor priees, nor due to direct domes-
tic demand expansion in any of the exporting countries (demand-based trade
reversal). These are the usual explanations for trade reversal (see, for example,
Ethier, pp. 134-6). With regard to the former case, our production technologies in
both exporting countries are characterized by fixed proportions; thus, any
changes in the factor prices due to the existence of monopsony or the export
embargo do not change the factor intensities. In the latter case, trade reversal
happens beeause the domestic demand in an exporting country expands to such an
extent (say due to the increase in population or income) that its domestic price is
higher than the price in the market of its importing partner's market and thus the
exporting country becomes an importing country. In our model, after demand
expansion in Japan, the U.S. and Canada still hold their positions as exporters of
the final product, yet their pattern of trade in the intermediate product is reversed.
One may label this kind of trade reversal as "foreign demand based trade rever-
sal."
The results, once again, follow from the relationships among supply curves.
Specifically, at relatively low levels of demand in Japan, and in the absence of
either monopsony pricing or export controls, Canada, under our assumptions, is
the low-cost producer of raw fish but the high cost processing country. Thus,
Canada, with a comparative advantage in raw fish harvesting, exports to the
higher harvesting cost country. At the higher level of demand in Japan, Canada's
comparative advantage switches from raw fish production to processing. At
higher levels of production of the final product, average harvesting costs in the42 Emami, Queirolo, and Johnston
U.S. are so much lower than those in Canada and U.S. processing costs so much
higher, per unit, that it pays the U.S. to export raw fish to Canadian processors.
It is not clear that these are, in fact, the circumstances that prevail, in general,
in the two countries. As we have noted repeatedly, the foregoing analysis ab-
stracts in significant ways from the specific details of the U.S./Canada GATT
dispute. That case, as it related to Pacific roe herring, pertained only to the
trans-boundary conflict between U.S. processors operating in Southeast Alaska
and Canadian buyers representing processors located in the extreme northern
coastal regions of British Columbia.
Nonetheless, Japanese demand for herring-roe, in its several product forms,
has increased'^ and Canada has purchased relatively large quantities'** of raw
herring from U.S. fishermen in the Southeast Alaska roe herring fisheries. As
reported in the U,S, Section 301 Petitionof Icicle Seafoods, Inc., etal., submitted
to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, in April of 1986,
"The Canadian processors' estimated share of the Kah Shakes herring catch
rose from less than 20% of the catch in 1982 to nearly 40% in 1985 (805 of 220
tons). In three years, U.S, processors' supply dropped by 660 tons, or nearly
one-third of the fishery, all lost to Canadian processors. Similarly, in Sitka,
the Canadian share grew from zero in 1984 to an estimated 300 tons in 1985
out of a catch of 7500 tons."
The U.S. petitioners clearly regarded Canadian competition in these markets
as an economic threat, while Canada apparently recognized an economic oppor-
tunity.
More important, perhaps, the foregoing suggests that analysis of trade patterns
involving both intermediate and final goods may require examination of cost
relationships beyond those associated with current production levels. For exam-
ple, where cost disparities are a consequence of differences in external economies
and diseconomies—certainly a strong possibility where trade is in products having
a natural resource base (so that real externalities are significant) and where the
exploitation of that natural resource represents a significant economic sector in a
region (so that pecuniary externalities play a large role)—the results suggested
here seem quite reasonable. At least, in our judgment, they merit more attention
than they have received to date.
Demand Expansion in Japan and Free Trade in R
In the absence of imperfections in the U.S. and Canadian R markets, as Dp
increases to Dp the equilibrium in each sector is found by equating SSp and Dp at
'' See, for example. Bill Atkinson's newsletter, various issues,
'" Canadian buyers have, to date, limited their purchases of raw roe-herring from U.S,
fishermen to the fisheries in Kah Shakes and Sitka Sound. These are the two principal
herring fisheries in Southeast Alaska. While Kah Shakes and Sitka Sound herring fisheries
are large, relative to the balance of the Southeast Alaska herring fisheries, the total South-
east catch has historically represented only approximately 15% to 20% of the aggregate
Alaska herring harvest. It is, in fact, the geographic proximity of these fisheries to Cana-
dian processors and their temporal proximity to the British Columbia fisheries (occurring
as they do immediately after the aforementioned) which have made the trans-boundary
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point E^, and the new equilibrium values are indicated with a superscript (F'),
Figure 4. At equalized factor V prices of Py' = Py*", U allocates qvF units of V
to produce qy p units of F, and C allocates qy^^F ""'ts of V to produce qy^F units
of F. With free trade factor R prices are equalized at the new level of PR' = PR^,
at which U's fishermen harvest qR* units of R, in total, of which (qj - qv,F) are
exported to Canada. Cs fishermen supply qR^' units of R to their domestic pro-
cessors. To produce qy^p units of F in C requires qy^p units of R to be combined
with qy'^F units of V. Thus, with free trade in R and the absence of market
imperfections, C imports (qy'^p - qR^') units of R from U, which is equal to the (qj
- qy p) units of R exported from U.
Conclusion
This study was originally inspired by features ofthe U.S.-Canada dispute between
Southeast Alaskan and Northern British Columbian processors over trade in un-
processed raw herring. Examination of this dispute led the authors to consider, in
the abstract, behavior of two rival seafood exporting countries competing in the
same import market when monopsony exists in the processing sector of one of
these countries, made possible, at least in part, by export restrictions in the other.
By going substantially beyond the specifics of that dispute the authors realized
that a broader point was at issue, namely, that while economic forces underlie
most trade disputes, they may, if allowed to play themselves out, render reactive
policies unnecessary: in the present case, that expansion of the demand for the
fmal product may, through trade reversal pressures, dilute the market power of
processor monopsony and make trade restriction policies irrelevant.
These findings are highly dependent on the relative positions of the supply
Pane) (a): USA Panel (b): Canada Panel (c): Japan
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curves—of both R and V—in Canada and the U,S. although they can be generated
under a variety of assumptions about that relationship. In the above discussion, as
output Increases, Canada changes from having a cost advantage in fishing to
having a cost advantage in processing vis-a-vis the U.S,
Suppose the R supply curves in the two countries are identical. Suppose,
further, that the supply curve of V in Canada is higher and flatter than its corre-
sponding curve in the U,S,, as shown in all figures. In this case the results of this
paper re-emerge. This means that before the demand in Japan expands, Canada,
in free trade, would have an incentive to export R to the U.S. due to higher
processing costs in Canada. However, as the Japanese demand increases, Canada
experiences cost advantages. This leads to trade reversal, as in the example
above.
Now suppose that processing costs are equal in the two countries but that the
supply curve of R in Canada is lower—at low harvesting levels—than that in the
U.S,, as is shown in all figures. Further suppose, however, that this cost advan-
tage disappears at higher harvesting levels—perhaps due to locational advantages
for the Canadian fleet but higher fuel and labor costs in Canada—so that the
Canadian supply curve intersects (from below) its U.S. counterpart. Again, the
results of this model re-appear. In this case the explanation is that Canada, being
the less costly harvester at low fishing levels, ships raw fish to the U.S.—or, at
least, under free trade would have an incentive to do so. As Japanese demand
expands, the U.S, emerges as the less costly fishing nation and, thus, trade re-
versal occurs once again. Thus it may be in Canada's interest to encourage sales
of finished products to Japan rather than to erect barriers on raw fish exports.'^
Other configurations could be considered. The point is that this model is useful
not only in understanding events underlying the U.S.-Canada trade dispute over
roe herring but may also provide insights into bilateral trade patterns in interme-
diate products among a large number of pairs of trading partners. It demonstrates
that existing trade patterns, existing market structures and existing trade policies
may change significantly, not only in response to explicit government action but
also in response to changing supply and demand conditions. Perhaps, then, con-
cern about unfair trade practices could more effectively be addressed by await-
ing—or even promoting—changes in market conditions than by issuing calls for
retaliation.
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